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ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the joint effects of accounting guidance type 
(principles-based versus rules-based) and legal liability regime (unlimited versus limited) 
on auditor decisions. Both the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) believe that moving to more principles-
based standards in the United States will allow companies and auditors to more 
appropriately reflect the economic substance of transactions in the financial statements. 
However, very little attention has been paid to the possibility that principles-based 
standards will be applied differently in the United States than in other countries due to a 
different legal regime. This paper explores how different legal liability regimes impact 
auditor judgments in principles-based and rules-based environments. Results suggest that 
auditors’ decisions differ based on the type of accounting guidance, and regulators may 
want to consider this when evaluating a potential change in standards. In my study, I 
predict and find that when the economic substance of a transaction suggests that the 
relatively more aggressive accounting treatment is appropriate, auditors make decisions 
most consistent with economic substance under a combination of principles-based 
guidance and limited auditor liability. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the joint effects of accounting guidance type 
(principles-based versus rules-based) and legal liability regime (unlimited versus limited) 
on auditor decisions. Both the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) believe that principles-based standards 
such as International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) allow companies and auditors 
a better opportunity to more appropriately reflect the economic substance of transactions 
in the financial statements (FASB, 2002; SEC, 2003b).
1
 Although reactions to adopting 
IFRS in the European Union have been positive (Armstrong et al. 2012), principles-based 
standards might not be applied in the same manner in the United States as in other 
counties because of differences in the litigation environment.
2
 Under the existing 
unlimited liability legal regime in the United States, a move to principles-based standards 
may lead to an unintended consequence: overly conservative auditor judgments. 
The current study investigates this potential unintended consequence of more 
principles-based guidance under the existing legal regime in the United States, and 
                                                          
1
 Regardless of whether IFRS is adopted in the United States, the SEC has expressed a desire to move 
towards more “objectives-based” (e.g., principles-based) standards (SEC, 2012); therefore, differences 
between principles-based and rules-based guidance in the United States are important regardless of whether 
a transition to IFRS in the United States is ever achieved. 
2
 For example, Ramseyer and Rasmusen (2010) note that securities class action suits, in particular, are 
abused in the U.S. legal system unlike any other country in the world. 
2 
suggests a potential mitigating factor for the use of a conservative heuristic by auditors: 
limiting auditor liability. I expect that a combination of principles-based guidance and
limited auditor liability will allow auditors to focus on the economic substance of a 
transaction, and therefore make decisions most consistent with economic substance. 
Results show that under this combination, auditors do make decisions most consistent 
with economic substance. Overall, my results suggest that auditors make decisions more 
consistent with economic substance under principles-based standards than under rules-
based standards. However, it is in the specific case of limited liability and principles-
based standards where auditors make decisions most consistent with economic substance. 
While principles-based standards have been implemented with apparent success 
in other countries, in the highly litigious environment in the United States, principles-
based standards might be applied differently.
3
 Legal liability concerns can impact auditor 
decision-making (Barron et al. 2001; Johnstone and Bedard 2003; Blay 2005; Abbott et 
al. 2006), and the impact of the legal liability regime could be heightened in the presence 
of principles-based standards.
4
 Practitioners have expressed concern that more principles-
based standards will further increase the already high level of auditor liability in the 
United States due to less detailed guidance available to use as a defense (Love and 
Eickemeyer 2009). Nusbaum (2007) also notes that liability issues are a top concern for 
audit firms, and an area where additional academic research is needed. 
                                                          
3
 Ramseyer and Rasmusen (2010) note the relatively litigious environment in the United States compared to 
other countries. For example, the United States had a higher number of lawyers per capita and a higher 
number of suits filed per capita than Australia, Canada, France, Japan, or England (Ramseyer and 
Rasmusen, 2010). 
4
 Prior research has shown that auditors recognize and respond to the litigation environment in the United 
States being riskier than that of the U.K., for example, by increasing fees for firms listed in the U.S., even 
when controlling for greater disclosure requirements (Seetharaman et al. 2002). 
3 
While legal standards suggest that auditors should be held liable only in the event 
of negligent behavior (e.g., Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 1931; SEC v. Arthur Young & 
Co., 1979), prior research suggests that jurors will sometimes hold auditors accountable 
for an audit failure regardless of the quality of the audit (Kadous 2000; Reffett 2010). 
Thus, auditors face some uncertainty regarding the criteria they will be held to in the 
event of a lawsuit. This uncertainty can motivate auditors to minimize the risk of a 
lawsuit by using a heuristic to choose the most conservative possible treatment (i.e., 
income decreasing), rather than the treatment that best reflects economic reality. 
Palmrose and Scholz (2004) show that 83% of restatements resulting in litigation occur 
when income is overstated. While the design of their study does not allow for causal 
inferences, their results suggest that litigation results more often in instances of 
overstated income, and therefore, auditors need to be wary of the potential litigation risk 
associated with allowing clients to overstate income. 
The weighting function of prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) 
suggests that auditors might overweight the possibility of a significant potential liability 
and allow this possibility to influence their decision making process. Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979) note that individuals typically overweight very small probabilities of 
negative outcomes.
5
 This overweighting of small probabilities of negative outcomes is 
evident, for example, when individuals choose to purchase insurance even when the 
probability of a catastrophic loss (such as a flood) is very small.
6
 However, accountability 
                                                          
5
 Although the catastrophic liability faced from shareholder lawsuits is at a firm level, this liability can have 
implications at an individual level as well. Individuals within the firm are impacted by firm effects (i.e., 
factors that impact the firm also impact the judgments of individuals working for the firm). 
6
 Note that audit firms are limited in their ability to cover potentially catastrophic losses through the 
purchase of insurance due to the high risk perceived by insurance companies (Center for Audit Quality 
[CAQ] 2008). 
4 
theory suggests that reducing the level of outcome accountability (i.e., legal liability) 
could reduce the effects of this bias (Simonson and Staw 1992; Tetlock 1992; Siegel-
Jacobs and Yates 1996; Lerner and Tetlock 1999). 
This paper contributes to both the audit judgment and decision-making literature 
and the principles- versus rules-based standards debate. The current study investigates 
whether principles-based guidance is applied differently under different legal liability 
regimes. Results show that under principles-based guidance, auditors make decisions 
most consistent with economic substance when auditor liability is limited. My study 
suggests that principles-based standards alone (without a limit to auditor liability) may 
not be enough to cause auditors to make the most appropriate decisions in a scenario 
where the economic substance of a transaction suggests a relatively more aggressive 
treatment. As such, this study provides one piece of evidence for the SEC to consider 
when making decisions about adopting more principles-based standards in the United 
States. This suggests that the SEC might consider limiting auditor liability or providing 
other safeguards for auditors if more principles-based standards are adopted. 
The paper proceeds in the following manner: the next section discusses prior 
literature and relevant theory and develops hypotheses; the following section describes 
the research method and analyses and discusses results; and the final section provides 
conclusions.
5 
CHAPTER 2 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Prior to the implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), academic 
literature generally suggested that, given sufficient latitude in the standards, auditors 
would allow clients to behave aggressively (Hackenbrack and Nelson 1996; Ng and Tan 
2003). Cuccia et al. (1995) showed that, in a tax setting, accounting professionals will 
interpret either the standard or the facts of a case opportunistically in order to reach the 
client-preferred conclusion. This suggests that accounting professionals can choose to 
make decisions consistent with client preferences regardless of the precision of the 
standard. Salterio and Koonce (1997) find that auditors also follow client preference 
when precedents do not clearly point to an appropriate accounting treatment. Through 
data collected from auditors, Nelson et al. (2002) found that managers attempt to manage 
earnings under both precise and imprecise standards, using both structured and 
unstructured transactions, respectively. However, these attempts to manage earnings are 
least successful (i.e., auditors were most likely to require adjustment) under a 
combination of precise accounting standards and transactions that were not structured. 
Therefore, the standard precision does have some effect on the likelihood of auditors’ 
allowing earnings management, depending on how managers attempt to manage earnings. 
Following the implementation of SOX, academic literature has suggested that the 
behavior of financial statement preparers has shifted towards being more conservative. 
Agoglia et al. (2011) conduct an experiment using financial statement
6 
preparers as participants and find that preparers exhibit greater concern with potential 
costs of litigation and second-guessing from regulators under less precise standards, and 
therefore, behave more conservatively. While Jamal and Tan (2010) also examine the 
behavior of financial statement preparers, they examine how the audit partner’s standards 
orientation impacts preparer judgments. The results of their study suggest that auditor 
mindset plays an important role in preparers’ reactions to principles-based guidance. 
In studies conducted with auditors after SOX implementation, unless specifically 
allowed via rules-based guidance (i.e., a bright-line threshold), auditors are shown to be 
more likely to make decisions consistent with the economic substance of a transaction 
rather than consistent with client preference. Peytcheva and Wright (2011) show that 
principles-based standards lead to increased epistemic motivation,
7
 which leads to auditor 
judgments that are more representative of the economic substance of the transaction. 
Segovia et al. (2009) also speak to the principles- versus rules-based standards debate 
from an auditor decision-making perspective, finding that rules-based standards appear to 
facilitate auditor agreement with aggressive client reporting. 
This existing literature suggests that principles-based standards will allow 
auditors to make decisions more consistent with the economic substance of a transaction. 
However, the design of previous studies is such that the decision that is more consistent 
with the economic substance of a transaction is also the more conservative decision 
(Agoglia et al. 2011; Jamal and Tan 2010; Peytcheva and Wright 2011; Segovia et al. 
2009). Therefore, it is unclear why these decisions are being made – are auditors truly 
attempting to best reflect the economic substance of a transaction, or simply making the 
                                                          
7
 Epistemic motivation is defined as “the desire to develop and hold a rich and accurate understanding of 
the world” (De Dreu et al., 2006, p. 928). 
7 
more conservative decision? This study attempts to disentangle these effects by looking 
at both a situation where the relatively more conservative option is most appropriate and 
a situation where the relatively more aggressive option is most appropriate. 
The FASB removed conservatism from the conceptual framework in 2010 (FASB 
2010), and the SEC has expressed concern with conservative reporting as well (SEC 1998 
and 2003a). Both academic literature (Jackson and Liu 2010) and regulators (SEC 1998 
and 2003a) have suggested that conservative reporting can be used to set up unnecessary 
reserves, which can be tapped into in order to manage earnings in the future. Therefore, 
conservative decision-making by auditors is not always appropriate, as it could lead to 
financial reporting that is inconsistent with economic substance. Hirshleifer and Teoh 
(2009) suggest that conservative accounting has an intuitive appeal due to the potential to 
reduce investors’ disappointment by managing expectations through conservative 
accounting. Auditors also have an incentive to behave conservatively. Auditors are faced 
with the risk of potential litigation from shareholders and have an incentive to avoid this 
costly litigation whenever possible. Since shareholder lawsuits generally stem from 
overstated income (Palmrose and Scholz 2004), making conservative (i.e., income 
decreasing) decisions can help auditors minimize their litigation risk. Therefore, it is 
important to determine whether auditor decisions under principles-based guidance are 
driven by a concern for minimizing legal liability or a desire to reflect the economic 
substance of transactions. 
Principles-based guidance allows financial statement preparers and auditors the 
freedom to report transactions based on the economic substance of the transaction and the 
spirit of the guidance, rather than following a strict rule. This ability to report transactions 
8 
differently based on differing circumstances can result in financial statements that more 
accurately reflect economic reality. This has been touted as one of the benefits of moving 
to more principles based standards in the United States (FASB 2002; SEC 2003b). 
Without the detailed guidance included in rules-based standards, auditors are forced to 
consider other factors, such as facts and circumstances indicative of the economic 
substance of the transaction, when determining the appropriate treatment of a transaction. 
If auditors no longer have this detailed guidance to rely on, they should be more likely to 
consider the economic substance of the transaction. 
Prior research in accounting has shown that auditors behave more consistent with 
economic substance under principles-based standards than under rules-based standards 
(Peytcheva and Wright 2011; Segovia et al. 2009). In those studies, the economic 
substance of the transaction was the more conservative treatment. I predict that in a 
setting where the more aggressive treatment is most consistent with economic substance, 
auditors will still be more likely to follow economic substance under principles-based 
guidance as compared to rules-based guidance. Principles-based guidance gives auditors 
more flexibility in their reporting choices and an opportunity to report consistent with 
economic substance, regardless of whether the economic substance is conservative or 
aggressive. This rationale leads to the following testable hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Under principles-based guidance, auditors will make 
decisions more consistent with economic reality than under rules-based 
guidance. 
Panel A and Panel B of Figure 2.1 depict the expectation that principles-based 
guidance leads to participants following the more economically appropriate decision 
(e.g., a main effect for type of guidance). As indicated in Hypothesis 1, the expectation 
holds true for both the conservative and aggressive accounting scenarios. 
9 
Auditors might not be able to mitigate legal liability by following appropriate 
accounting and auditing standards.
8
 Existing research has shown that the general public 
(i.e., potential jury pools in an auditor liability case) is not familiar with accounting and 
auditing standards, and therefore, will often hold auditors accountable regardless of how 
well the standards are followed (Kadous 2000; Kadous and Mercer 2012; Reffett 2010). 
Reffett (2010) finds that performing additional fraud detection procedures does not 
protect auditors from shareholder lawsuits in the event of undetected fraud. Kadous 
(2000) finds that jurors’ assessment of auditors’ liability is based on whether or not the 
company went bankrupt, rather than the quality of the audit. This increased assessment of 
blame can lead to negative litigation outcomes. As such, auditors are forced to determine 
an alternative approach to minimize legal liability. Cornell and Warne (2012) also find 
that under principles-based standards, investors assign greater legal blame to auditors in 
the event of a negative outcome. As previously stated, Palmrose and Scholz (2004) show 
that litigation is often the result of overstated (as opposed to understated) income. One 
way auditors can minimize their legal liability is through using a conservative heuristic 
(i.e., when in doubt, do not allow income-increasing treatments and allow income-
decreasing treatments). 
Blay (2005) shows that auditors interpret audit evidence in a more conservative 
manner for a client with higher litigation risk, and in turn make more conservative 
decisions. This again suggests that litigation risk affects auditors’ information processing 
                                                          
8
 Cohen et al. (2012) examine auditor judgments under both principles- and rules-based standards while 
manipulating regulatory enforcement. Regulatory enforcement and legal liability are two different concerns 
faced by auditors. Auditors can reduce the risk of regulatory enforcement actions through following 
appropriate accounting and auditing standards. However, following appropriate accounting and auditing 
standards might not be enough to mitigate legal liability. Additionally, Cohen et al. (2012) focuses on 
auditors’ constraining aggressive reporting by management, which may become less important under 
principles-based standards if managers themselves are already behaving more conservatively (Agoglia et 
al., 2011). 
10 
and judgments. Krishnan and Krishnan (1997) show that auditor resignation and factors 
indicating high litigation risk are highly correlated, supporting the idea that, in extreme 
circumstances, auditors will resign rather than face high litigation risk. Additionally, 
Gramling et al. (1998) show that for high risk clients, there is a reduced likelihood that 
auditors will accept clients under joint and several liability. In less extreme scenarios, 
Johnstone and Bedard (2003) show that when firms do accept higher risk clients, they 
tend to have higher billing rates and are more likely to use specialists. Both higher billing 
rates and the use of specialists can be seen as ways to mitigate legal liability, suggesting 
that auditors seek ways to minimize the cost and/or risk of litigation. 
Although not considering a monetary cap on auditor liability, several studies in 
the prior literature have experimentally shown that differing legal liability regimes affect 
auditor liability (Dopuch and King 1992; Dopuch et al. 1997; King and Schwartz 2000). 
Regulators worldwide have expressed concern regarding the potential magnitude of 
auditor liability (European Commission 2008; Treasury 2008). Limited auditor liability, 
in the form of auditor liability caps, already exists in some countries, such as Germany 
and Austria (Gietzmann and Quick 1998; Nobes and Zeff 2008). However, academic 
research has done little to investigate the potential effect of limiting liability through 
auditor liability caps on auditor judgments. Smith (2012) found that limiting auditor 
liability can have negative effects on investor perception of audit quality; however, this 
does not directly address how auditor judgments and actual audit quality are affected by 
limiting auditor liability. 
The weighting function of prospect theory suggests that individuals overweight 
small probabilities for catastrophic losses (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Under 
11 
unlimited liability, catastrophic financial losses are possible for auditors. Therefore, it 
follows that potential lawsuits will likely be overweighted by auditors under an unlimited 
liability regime. In order to mitigate potential lawsuits, auditors could choose to follow a 
conservative heuristic. As previously stated, prior research has shown that 83% of 
restatements occur when income is overstated (Palmrose and Scholz 2004). Therefore, 
using a conservative heuristic could reduce the number and amount of lawsuits to which 
an auditor is subject. 
Accountability theory also suggests that concern with facing legal liability will 
cause auditors to attempt to minimize risk by behaving conservatively. Prior research in 
accounting (DeZoort et al. 2006) has found that auditors behave more conservatively 
when making materiality judgments under accountability pressures such as justification 
and feedback pressure. These types of accountability represent process accountability, or 
accountability for the decision making process (rather than the outcome). Legal liability 
is a type of outcome accountability, or accountability for the end result of a decision 
rather than the decision making process itself. Prior research in accountability has found 
that outcome accountability has negative effects on individuals’ decision making 
(Simonson and Staw, 1992; Tetlock, 1992; Siegel-Jacobs and Yates, 1996; Lerner and 
Tetlock, 1999). For example, under high levels of outcome accountability, individuals are 
more likely to resort to an overly simplified heuristic such as maintaining the status quo 
(Tetlock and Boettger, 1994) or remaining committed to a losing course of action 
(Simonson and Staw, 1992). Reducing outcome accountability can lessen the use of these 
decision making heuristics. Since legal liability is a type of outcome accountability for 
auditors, limiting liability can take auditors’ focus away from potential lawsuits and 
12 
allow them to focus on the appropriate treatment for the transaction. This rationale leads 
to the following testable hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: When the economic substance of a transaction is relatively 
more aggressive, auditors will make decisions more consistent with 
economic reality under limited liability than under unlimited liability. 
As shown in Figure 2.1, Panel A, Hypothesis 2 predicts that under limited 
liability, auditors will make more economically appropriate decisions. 
Under principles-based guidance, auditors are not constrained by rules and have 
the ability to allow reporting most consistent with the economic substance of a 
transaction. However, if the economic substance of a transaction is relatively more 
aggressive, the full benefits of principles-based guidance might not be realized when 
liability is unlimited and auditors are focused on potential catastrophic losses (Kahneman 
and Tversky 1979). When liability is limited, auditors are less focused on potential 
litigation and less likely to default to a conservative heuristic. Therefore, the combination 
of principles-based guidance and limited auditor liability gives auditors both the ability 
(supported by the guidance) and the incentive (due to less concern with legal liability) to 
report most consistent with the economic substance of a transaction. This rationale leads 
to the following testable hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: When the economic substance of a transaction is relatively 
more aggressive, auditors will make decisions most consistent with 
economic reality under a combination of principles-based guidance and 
limited liability.  
As shown in Figure 2.1, Panel A, when the economic substance of the transaction 
is more aggressive, the only scenario where auditors are predicted to make decisions 
consistent with economic substance is in the case of principles-based guidance and 
limited liability. 
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CHAPTER 3 
METHOD 
3.1 PARTICIPANTS 
Participants are 93 auditors (primarily seniors and managers) from Big Four, 
international, national, and regional accounting firms (see Table 1 for descriptive 
statistics).
9
 Audit seniors are often the first auditors to review a transaction and give their 
opinion on the appropriate treatment based on the applicable accounting guidance. Audit 
managers also review transactions that are material to the financial statements and 
determine the appropriate accounting treatment. Prior literature suggests that decisions 
and documentation by audit seniors affects subsequent evaluation by partners (Ricchiute 
1999). This suggests that decisions made by audit seniors will ultimately affect the final 
decision by the audit team on an appropriate accounting treatment. Therefore, both audit 
seniors and audit managers are appropriate participants for the current study. 
3.2 DESIGN 
The design of this experiment is a 2   2   2 repeated measures design, as shown in 
Figure 3.1. Independent variables are the type of accounting guidance (GUIDANCE), the 
auditor legal liability regime in place (LIABILITY), and the more economically 
appropriate decision (ECONOMIC). GUIDANCE is manipulated between subjects as 
either principles-based or rules-based. LIABILITY is manipulated within subjects as 
                                                          
9
 Auditor title, and firm, and years of audit experience are not significant in any of the models or tests of 
hypotheses. Additionally, the exclusion of participants at the Audit Staff level does not change the direction 
or significance of any of the models or tests of hypotheses. Therefore, the analyses reported include the full 
data set. 
15 
either limited or unlimited. ECONOMIC is manipulated within subjects as either 
relatively more conservative or relatively more aggressive. The manipulations of the 
three independent variables are discussed in more detail on the pages that follow. See 
Appendix 1 for details of the instrument and manipulations. 
In the current study, GUIDANCE is operationalized as the type of firm guidance 
participants receive. In the rules-based condition, participants receive firm guidance with 
bright-line thresholds stating when revenue recognition is appropriate. In the principles-
based condition, participants receive firm guidance without the bright-line thresholds, 
stating only general principles regarding when revenue recognition is appropriate.
10
 
In practice, auditors can face legal liability when there is an audit failure, or 
anytime their client is required to restate financial statements and the stock price 
decreases. In the experiment, LIABILITY is manipulated as either an unlimited or limited 
liability country. Participants are provided with a sentence stating that the legal regime in 
the country where their client is located either allows investors to recover all of their 
losses plus punitive damages from auditors (unlimited) or auditor liability is limited and 
only allows investors to recover a portion of their losses from auditors (limited). 
ECONOMIC is manipulated as the decision most consistent with economic 
substance being to require immediate recognition of revenue in the “relatively more 
aggressive” setting and to require delayed recognition of revenue in the “relatively more 
                                                          
10
 GUIDANCE is chosen as the variable of interest rather than actual accounting standards in order to 
provide for a cleaner manipulation of similar length and content. 
16 
conservative” setting. The decision most consistent with economic substance in each case 
was confirmed in a consultation with a panel of audit partners.
11
 
Participants are randomly assigned to one of the four treatment combinations 
shown in Figure 3.1, and each participant is asked to make a judgment on two cases. 
Each participant sees one case where ECONOMIC is relatively more conservative, and 
one case where ECONOMIC is relatively more aggressive. In one of the two cases, 
LIABILITY is unlimited, and in the other case, LIABILITY is limited. The order of both 
within-subjects manipulations (ECONOMIC and LIABILITY) is balanced across 
participants. The GUIDANCE variable is manipulated between subjects. The repeated 
measures design used in the current study allows for greater statistical power than purely 
between-subjects designs, while still minimizing the time commitment from participants 
by providing them two of the four possible treatment combinations.  
The dependent variable in this study is likelihood of requiring revenue to be 
recognized, measured on a ten-point scale ranging from 1 being “definitely require 
delayed recognition of revenue” to 10 being “definitely require immediate recognition of 
revenue.” In addition to the main dependent measure, I also ask several supplemental 
questions in order to gain insight into participants’ judgments. Participants are asked to 
list up to three factors influencing their judgment. Participants are also asked about their 
beliefs regarding the treatment that would best reflect economic reality in each scenario. 
These supplemental measures are discussed further in the Supplemental Analyses section. 
                                                          
11
 A panel of 5 audit partners was consulted in the development of the cases. The partners’ average rating 
for the “relatively more aggressive” case was a 6.75 on a 10-point scale (with 1 being “definitely not 
recognize revenue” and 10 being “definitely recognize revenue”). Consistent with verbal feedback from the 
partners, this indicates that in the relatively more aggressive case, revenue recognition is the most 
appropriate judgment, but the case is still somewhat ambiguous. The “relatively more conservative” setting 
was developed by making changes to the case that the panel of partners indicated would change their 
judgment as to what the appropriate treatment should be. 
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3.3 TASK 
Participants are asked to read a case study describing two hypothetical clients that 
produce transaction-specialized tooling equipment and machinery for resale. One client is 
located in a country where auditor liability is limited, and the other client is located in a 
country where auditor liability is unlimited. The case describes a transaction for each 
client. In each transaction, the client produces two related pieces of specific equipment 
for a customer during the fiscal year under audit. One piece of equipment was delivered 
to the customer prior to year-end, and the second is scheduled to be delivered within six 
months after year-end. Auditor participants are asked to decide whether or not to allow 
the client to recognize revenue related to the delivery of the first piece of equipment in 
each transaction. 
In one transaction, the facts are such that requiring revenue recognition is most 
appropriate (relatively more aggressive). In the other transaction, the facts are such that 
requiring delayed revenue recognition is most appropriate (relatively more conservative). 
Thus, there are four possible conditions each participant can see (limited liability and 
relatively more aggressive; limited liability and relatively more conservative; unlimited 
liability and relatively more aggressive; and unlimited liability and relatively more 
conservative). Each participant will see two of these possible combinations, with each 
participant seeing both levels of each of the two within subject manipulations.
12
 Order of 
the two transactions is randomized across participants to control for potential order 
                                                          
12 
Recall that GUIDANCE is a between-subjects variable; therefore, for each of the possible combinations 
of scenarios seen by participants, approximately half of the participants will receive principles-based 
GUIDANCE, with the remaining half receiving rules-based GUIDANCE.
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effects.
13
 See Figure 3.1 for a depiction of the different treatment combinations seen by 
each subject. Participants are provided with relevant firm guidance for revenue 
recognition in the rules-based and principles-based GUIDANCE manipulation.
14
 
3.4 TEST OF HYPOTHESES 
I ask two manipulation check questions to test participant’s recall of the litigation 
environment for each client. A total of 81 out of 93 (87.1%) participants passed both 
manipulation check questions. Dropping the participants who failed the manipulation 
checks does not change the direction or significance of the model or tests of hypotheses; 
therefore, all participants are included in the analyses reported below. Participants had an 
average of 5.30 years of audit work experience and spent an average of 29.7% of their 
time on public clients. Additional descriptive statistics are reported in Table 3.1. 
Least square means for each condition are shown in Table 3.2 and presented 
graphically in Figure 3. I test the hypotheses using a repeated measures mixed model 
with GUIDANCE, LIABILTY, and ECONOMIC as the three independent variables, and 
auditor decision as the dependent variable.
15
 Test results are tabulated in Table 3.3.
16
 
                                                          
13
 Order was not significant when included in the analysis of hypotheses. 
14
 Participants are provided with firm guidance and permitted to reference that guidance when making their 
judgments, consistent with practice, in order to test how principles-based versus rules-based guidance is 
interpreted by auditors. Making the guidance available to participants throughout the experiment allows for 
testing of the variable of interest, rather than creating a memory task. 
15
 The model assumption of constant variance was met (Brown-Forsythe test F=0.93, p=0.487 [Full 
Model]; F=1.56, p=0.204 [Aggressive Condition Only]; and F=0.72, p=0.543 [Conservative Condition 
Only]). The model assumption of normality was slightly violated. Logarithmic transformation of the data to 
remedy the violation of normality did not change the direction or significance of any of the models or tests 
of hypotheses; therefore, for ease of interpretation, results are based on the initial, non-transformed data set. 
16
 Since the GUIDANCE variable is between-subjects, the Subject within GUIDANCE mean square is the 
appropriate error term for this effect. Since both LIABILITY and ECONOMIC are within-subjects, the 
mean square error is the appropriate error term for these effects. 
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Hypothesis 1 predicts a main effect for accounting guidance type. A significant 
effect for the variable GUIDANCE in the expected direction would indicate that 
Hypothesis 1 is supported. In the mixed model, the variable GUIDANCE is significant 
(p=0.004, one-tailed), indicating support for Hypothesis 1 (see Table 3.3, Panel A). For 
the ECONOMIC aggressive condition, the variable GUIDANCE is significant in the 
expected direction (p=0.003, one-tailed), further supporting Hypothesis 1 (see Table 3.3, 
Panel B). For the ECONOMIC conservative condition, the variable GUIDANCE is not 
significant (p=0.384, two-tailed) (see Table 3.3 Panel C). Comparing the least square 
means for each GUIDANCE condition shows that in the ECONOMIC aggressive 
condition, participants in the principles-based condition are more likely to appropriately 
allow revenue recognition as compared to participants in the rules-based condition (least 
squares means of 8.58 and 7.52, respectively; t=2.77, p=0.003, one-tailed) (see Table 
3.2). In the ECONOMIC conservative condition, participants in the principles-based 
condition are not significantly more likely to appropriately not allow revenue recognition 
as compared to participants in the rules-based condition (least squares means of 3.26 and 
2.89, respectively; t=-0.87, p=0.384, two-tailed) (see Table 3.2). Therefore, Hypothesis 1 
is supported for the aggressive condition. However, for the conservative condition, 
Hypothesis 1 is not supported.
17
 
Hypothesis 2 predicts a main effect for legal liability regime when the economic 
substance of a transaction is relatively more aggressive. A significant effect for the 
                                                          
17
 The interactions between the variable GUIDANCE and four measures of experience (U.S. GAAP 
experience, IFRS experience, U.S. GAAP revenue recognition for multiple product shipments experience, 
and IFRS revenue recognition for multiple product shipments experience) were not significant in any of the 
models or tests of hypotheses. Additionally, the interactions between the variable GUIDANCE and the 
influence of both flexibility and restrictions inherent in the guidance were not significant in any of the 
models or tests of hypotheses. 
20 
variable LIABILITY in the expected direction (that is, judgments under limited liability 
are higher on the previously mentioned 1 to 10 scale than judgments under unlimited 
liability) when the variable ECONOMIC is the relatively more aggressive option would 
indicate that Hypothesis 2 is supported. When ECONOMIC is aggressive, there is no 
significant difference for the variable LIABILITY (t=0.34, p=0.736, two-tailed). 
Therefore, Hypothesis 2 is not supported (see Table 3.3, Panel B). 
Hypothesis 3 predicts an interaction between GUIDANCE and LIABILITY. 
Specifically, Hypothesis 3 suggests that auditor judgments will be most consistent with 
economic reality in the principles-based guidance/limited liability cells, when economic 
substance is relatively more aggressive. In order to test for this interaction, I use contrast 
coding based on the pattern of expected results shown in Figure 2.1, Panel A. Statistical 
analysis using contrast coding is significant (t=2.47, p=0.008, one-tailed); therefore, 
Hypothesis 3 is supported. This result indicates that under principles-based standards, 
auditors may need a limit to liability in order to make decisions most consistent with 
economic substance when the economic substance of a transaction is relatively more 
aggressive.
18
 
3.5 SUPPLEMENTAL ANALYSES 
In addition to the main dependent variable (decision to allow revenue recognition or not 
allow revenue recognition), participants are asked several supplemental questions. First, 
participants are asked to list the three factors most influential in their judgment. This 
question allows me to explore process variables underlying the auditors’ decisions, as 
well as provide information regarding the effect of the manipulations. I expect to find that 
                                                          
18
 Inferences for all hypotheses are unchanged when adjusting for multiple comparisons using the 
Bonferroni method. 
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in the unlimited LIABILITY condition (cells A, C, E, and G in Figure 3.1) participants 
will be more likely to list litigation risk as a primary factor in their decision than 
participants in the limited LIABILITY condition (cells B, D, F, and H in Figure 3.1). 
Secondarily, I expect participants in cells A, C, E, and G to be more likely to mention 
intentionally choosing the more conservative treatment than participants in cells B, D, F, 
and H. Text responses were coded by the author and a second independent coder, and all 
differences were mutually resolved. The author and the second coder were both blind to 
experimental conditions while coding. Inter-rater agreement was 94.1% for litigation risk 
and 99.5% for conservatism (Cohen’s Kappa of 0.70 and 0.89, respectively, both 
significantly different from zero, p<0.001). Contrary to expectation, participants were not 
significantly more likely to list litigation risk as a factor in their decision in the unlimited 
LIABILITY condition (t=0.25, p=0.801, two-tailed). Participants also were not 
significantly more likely to mention intentionally choosing the more conservative 
treatment in the unlimited LIABILITY condition (t=0.45, p=0.652, two-tailed). Given 
that neither litigation risk nor intentional conservatism were significantly different 
between liability conditions; however, the interaction between LIABILITY and 
GUIDANCE was significant; the effect litigation risk on participants’ judgments may be 
a subconscious effect. 
Hypothesis 1 predicts that auditors will make decisions more consistent with 
economic reality under principles-based guidance than under rules-based guidance. 
Evidence from the mixed model and from a comparison of the least square means in the 
ECONOMIC aggressive condition supports this prediction. However, this difference 
could be due to participants’ belief of what the true economic substance of the transaction 
22 
is, or due to participants intentionally reporting in a more conservative manner under 
rules-based standards. In order to disentangle these two potential causes, supplemental 
analysis was performed on participants’ responses to a process measure question 
regarding the participants’ belief of what treatment best reflects economic reality. 
After making a judgment on the treatment they require and listing the factors most 
influential in their judgment, participants are then asked to assess what treatment they 
believe best reflects economic reality on a ten-point scale ranging from 1 being 
“definitely delay recognition of revenue until the next fiscal year” to 10 being “definitely 
immediately recognize revenue in the current fiscal year” (the same scale as the 
dependent variable measure). Responses to this question give insight into whether 
participants in the rules-based GUIDANCE condition are able to identify the 
economically appropriate treatment, yet are unwilling to follow that treatment due to 
perceived constraint from the guidance.
19
 Supplemental analyses for this question are 
tested using a calculated difference between the participants’ dependent variable 
responses and responses to what they believe best reflects economic reality. Mean 
difference calculations (shown in Table 3.4, Panel A) for all cells except for cell A 
(principles-based GUIDANCE, unlimited LIABILITY, aggressive ECONOMIC cell) 
indicate that participants responded to the dependent variable question in a more 
conservative manner than their belief of the economic reality of the transaction. For cell 
A, the mean difference was zero. Results shown in Table 3.4, Panel B indicate that 
participants in the rules-based GUIDANCE condition have a marginally significantly 
greater difference than participants in the principles-based GUIDANCE condition 
                                                          
19
 The study was administered online, and this question is on a separate screen from the dependent variable 
measure. Participants are not allowed to go back and change their initial judgment after viewing this 
question. 
23 
(t=1.47, p=0.072, one-tailed). Supporting Hypothesis 1, this suggests that auditor 
participants in the rules-based condition are more likely than those in the principles-based 
condition to require their client to report more conservatively than they believe the true 
economic reality of the transaction warrants. 
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TABLE 3.1 – DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
c
 The other category represents any “Primary Industry” response with fewer than two 
participants in that industry. There are no significant industry effects in any of my 
analyses.  
Panel A: Experience with U.S. GAAP and IFRS 
 
 Mean
a
 
U.S. GAAP experience
 
6.08 
U.S. GAAP revenue recognition for 
multiple product shipments experience
 
4.05 
IFRS experience 2.91 
IFRS revenue recognition for multiple 
product shipments experience
 
2.16 
 
 
a
 Measured on a scale of 1 to 7, where 1=Not at all familiar and 7=Very Familiar 
 
Panel B: Job Title 
 
 Number 
Audit Staff 12 
Audit Senior 39 
Audit Manager 25 
Audit Senior Manager 14 
Audit Partner 1 
Other
b
 2 
  
b 
The other category includes one Advisory Senior Manager and one Advisory Senior 
 
Panel C: Primary Industry 
 
 Number 
Manufacturing 29 
Financial Services 23 
Government/Non-profit 11 
Retail 7 
Technology 4 
Healthcare 4 
Construction 3 
Real Estate 3 
Other/Not industry specific
c
 9 
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TABLE 3.2 – LEAST SQUARE MEANS FOR AUDITOR DECISION 
(DEPENDENT VARIABLE) BY CONDITION 
 
Economic Substance Aggressive 
 
Unlimited 
Liability 
Limited 
Liability 
Marginal 
Means 
 
Principles-Based 
Guidance 
 
8.31 
n=23 
8.86 
n=25 
8.58 
n=48 
 
Rules-Based 
Guidance 
 
7.92 
n=24 
7.11 
n=21 
7.52 
n=45 
Marginal Means 
8.11 
n=47 
7.98 
n=46 
n=93 
 
 
Economic Substance Conservative 
 
Unlimited 
Liability 
Limited 
Liability 
Marginal 
Means 
 
Principles-Based 
Guidance 
 
3.52 
n=25 
3.01 
n=23 
3.26 
n=48 
 
Rules-Based 
Guidance 
 
3.24 
n=21 
2.53 
n=24 
2.89 
n=45 
Marginal Means 
3.38 
n=46 
2.77 
n=47 
n=93 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Auditor decision whether or not to recognize revenue, measured on 
a 10-point scale (1=definitely require delayed recognition of revenue and 10=definitely 
require immediate recognition of revenue). 
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TABLE 3.3 – RESULTS 
Panel A: Full Mixed Model 
Effect DF F -value P-value* 
    
LIABILITY 90 0.25 0.620 
GUIDANCE 89 7.22 0.009 
ECONOMIC 90 263.46 <0.001 
LIABILITY*GUIDANCE 90 1.72 0.193 
INFLREV 89 29.18 <0.001 
GAAPREV 89 5.71 0.019 
 
Panel B: Economic Substance Aggressive 
Source DF Type III SS Mean Square F-value P-value* 
      
LIABILITY 88 0.39 0.39 0.11 0.736 
GUIDANCE 88 26.18 26.18 7.66 0.007 
LIABILITY*GUIDANCE 88 10.49 10.49 3.07 0.083 
INFLREG 88 45.32 45.32 13.27 0.001 
 
Panel C: Economic Substance Conservative 
Source DF Type III SS Mean Square F-value P-value* 
      
LIABILITY 88 8.35 8.35 2.02 0.159 
GUIDANCE 88 3.17 3.17 0.77 0.384 
LIABILITY*GUIDANCE 88 0.23 0.23 0.06 0.815 
INFLREV 88 109.26 109.26 26.39 <0.001 
 
GUIDANCE= Type of accounting guidance 
LIABILITY= Auditor legal liability regime in place 
ECONOMIC= The more economically appropriate decision 
INFLREG= Influence of potential regulatory action 
INFLREV= Influence of desire not to overstate revenue 
GAAPREV= U.S. GAAP revenue recognition for multiple product shipments experience 
 
*All p-values are two-tailed  
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TABLE 3.4 – SUPPLEMENTAL ANALYSES 
Panel A: Mean Differences – Required Treatment vs. Belief of Economic Reality 
Economic Substance Aggressive  
 
Unlimited 
Liability 
Limited 
Liability 
Marginal 
Means 
 
Principles-Based 
Guidance 
 
0.00 
n=23 
0.28 
n=25 
0.15 
n=48 
 
Rules-Based 
Guidance 
 
0.29 
n=24 
0.95 
n=21 
0.60 
n=45 
Marginal Means 
0.15 
n=47 
0.59 
n=46 
n=93 
 
Economic Substance Conservative 
 
 
Unlimited 
Liability 
Limited 
Liability 
Marginal 
Means 
 
Principles-Based 
Guidance 
 
0.32 
n=25 
1.22 
n=23 
0.75 
n=48 
 
Rules-Based 
Guidance 
 
0.81 
n=21 
1.25 
n=24 
1.04 
n=45 
Marginal Means 
0.54 
n=46 
1.23 
n=47 
n=93 
 
Participants are asked to assess what treatment they believe best reflects economic reality 
on a ten-point scale ranging from 1 being “definitely delay recognition of revenue until 
the next fiscal year” to 10 being “definitely immediately recognize revenue in the current 
fiscal year” (the same scale as the dependent variable measure). Supplemental analyses 
for this question are tested using a calculated difference between the participants’ 
dependent variable responses and responses to what they believe best reflects economic 
reality. In all cells (other than Principles-Based, Unlimited, Aggressive where the mean 
difference is 0.00), participants responded to the dependent variable measure in a more 
conservative manner than the economically appropriate measure. 
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TABLE 3.4 – SUPPLEMENTAL ANALYSES – CONTINUED 
Panel B: Contrast Testing of Principles-Based vs. Rules-Based Differences 
Contrast DF F –value P-value* 
Difference: RULES<PRINCIPLES 182 2.15 0.145 
 
*P-value is two-tailed 
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CHAPTER 4 
CONCLUSION 
Both the SEC (SEC, 2003b) and the FASB (FASB, 2002) believe that moving to more 
principles-based standards in the United States will allow companies and auditors to more 
appropriately reflect the economic substance of transactions in the financial statements. 
However, to my knowledge, academic research has not yet tested whether principles-
based standards will be applied differently by auditors in the United States than in other 
countries due to a different legal regime, specifically, a regime with unlimited auditor 
liability. The current paper explores whether auditors require treatments more consistent 
with the economic substance of a transaction under principles-based guidance, and 
whether limiting auditor liability can improve auditor decision making under both 
principles- and rules-based accounting guidance. Additionally, the current study 
examines auditor decisions both in a scenario where the less conservative treatment is 
most consistent with economic reality and in a scenario where the more conservative 
treatment is most consistent with economic reality. This design allows me to disentangle 
the effects of conservatism and economic substance of transactions on auditor decisions. 
Results suggest that principles-based guidance may be applied differently under different 
levels of auditor liability, and regulators in the United States may want to consider this 
when evaluating the change in standards. Specifically, the results show that when the 
economic substance of a transaction is relatively more aggressive, auditor participants 
make decisions most consistent with the economic substance of a transaction, under a 
 32 
combination of principles-based standards and limited auditor liability. Since the SEC has 
exhibited concern for overly conservative judgments, the findings of the current study 
may be of interest to regulators and other policy makers (SEC, 1998; 2003a). 
The finding that auditors appear to intentionally behave conservatively under 
rules-based standards, as discussed in the supplemental analysis section, suggests some 
interesting avenues for future research. Further studies may want to investigate whether 
auditors are less likely to behave in a more conservative manner than they believe is 
warranted by the economic substance of a transaction when they are made aware of their 
conservative behavior, or when client preference is made salient. Alternatively, auditors 
may be more likely to intentionally behave conservatively if potential enforcement from 
regulators such as the SEC or Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) is 
made salient. 
One limitation of the present study is that the liability faced by auditor 
participants in practice involves real consequences that are not faced by participants in 
the current study; however, this biases against the hypothesized findings. Additionally, 
findings in this study may not generalize to other financial reporting decisions. 
Nonetheless, this study provides some initial evidence regarding how auditors in the U.S. 
interpret principles-based and rules-based guidance, particularly in scenarios where the 
less conservative accounting treatment is most appropriate, and how the level of auditor 
liability might change auditor decisions. Future research can investigate whether the 
salience of auditor liability affects auditor decisions, as well as additional factors that 
may impact the successful implementation of more principles-based standards in the 
United States.  
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APPENDIX A: INSTRUMENT EXCERPTS AND MANIPULATIONS 
Legal Liability Manipulation (Within Subjects) 
Legal Liability Unlimited 
Specialized Machine is located in Country X. Country X’s legal regime is such that 
investors can recover all of their investment losses plus punitive damages from auditors; 
that is, auditor liability is unlimited.  
Legal Liability Limited 
Specialized Machine is located in Country Y. Country Y’s legal regime is such that 
investors can recover a portion of their investment losses from auditors; that is, auditor 
liability is limited. 
Economic Substance Manipulation (Within Subjects) 
Economic Substance Aggressive 
Machine A was delivered two months before the end of the fiscal year. Machine B is 
scheduled to be delivered within the first six months of the next fiscal year. Machine B is 
not necessary for Golf Clubs to be able to use Machine A. Revenue related to each piece 
of equipment can be independently determined. Revenue related to Machine A is $8.15 
million. Revenue related to Machine B is $2.85 million. Due to the specific nature of the 
equipment, it is unlikely that Golf Clubs would be able to resell either piece of 
equipment. 
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Economic Substance Conservative 
Machine C was delivered two months before the end of the fiscal year. Machine D is 
scheduled to be delivered within the first six months of the next fiscal year. Machine D is 
necessary for Golf Clubs to be able to use Machine C. Revenue related to each piece of 
equipment can be independently determined. Revenue related to Machine C is $8.15 
million. Revenue related to Machine D is $2.85 million. Due to the specific nature of the 
equipment, it is unlikely that Golf Clubs would be able to resell either piece of 
equipment. 
Firm Guidance Manipulation (Between Subjects) 
Principles-Based Manipulation 
Revenue for the sale of goods can be recognized if: 
(a) the entity has transferred to the buyer the significant risks and rewards of 
ownership of the goods; 
(b) the amount of revenue can be measured reliably; 
(c) it is probable that the economic benefits associated with the transaction will flow 
to the entity; and 
(d) the delivered item or items have value to the customer on a standalone basis. 
Rules-Based Manipulation 
Revenue for the sale of goods can be recognized if: 
(a) the entity has transferred to the buyer at least 75% of the risks and rewards of 
ownership of the goods; 
(b) the amount of revenue can be measured reliably; 
(c) there is greater than 90% likelihood that the economic benefits associated with the 
transaction will flow to the entity; and 
(d) the delivered item or items have value to the customer on a standalone basis. 
 
